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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Italian financial markets were generally 
characterized by concentrated ownership, weak 
investor protection and State ownership (Gupta, 
2014), that is, Italy is typically considered a country 
where low investor protection enables controlling 
shareholders to enjoy high private benefits (Belcredi 
& Enriques, 2014; Esposito De Falco, 2014). However, 
several changes have also been made to the Italian 
corporate governance: the presence of foreign 
institutional investors has been growing steadily, the 
separation between ownership and control via the 
pyramidal and dual class shares has been decreasing 
(with regard to dual class shares the number of 
firms issuing non-voting shares has dropped from 
70 in 1998 to 19 in 2015 (Consob, 2016), the legal 
framework has changed and the investor protection 
has been increasing remarkably (Law 149/1992 that 
introduces the mandatory OPA, Law Decree. 
58/1998 and other pieces of legislation on the 
protection of minority). 
It, therefore, appears interesting to ask what 
has happened and what is the current status of 
private benefits of control in Italy? Private benefits 
of control derive from the separation of the residual 
claim right and residual control rights attributed to 
the controlling shareholders. When the residual 
claim (for example the cash flow right which reflects 
the return on investment represented by the shares 
that a controlling shareholder owns as a proportion 
of the total value of the firm) is not consistent with 
the residual control right (the voting right which is 
represented by the shares that a controlling 
shareholder owns), there is a private benefit of 
control.  
Private benefits of control can be either 
pecuniary or non-pecuniary and they can be drawn 
out by the controlling shareholders of the firm 
without necessarily sharing them with other 
shareholders (Kang & Kim, 2006). As shown by 
Sancetta and Gennaro (2009), these benefits can 
assume three different forms: i) psychological 
benefits; ii) cash flow that the controlling coalition 
can draw out of a company (personal benefits, 
dividend policy, M&A, etc.), diverting assets away 
from other shareholders; iii) additional cash flow 
that the controlling coalition (external synergies) can 
develop outside the company (see also Zanetti, 
2004). According to the taxonomy of Pacces (2008) 
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the private benefits of control can be classified in 
three categories: 1. Diversionary (or bad): implying 
wealth distractions at the expenses of minority 
shareholders, such as in the case of over or 
undervalued insider dealing transactions; 
2. Distortionary (or ugly): implying inefficient target 
pursuit, as in the case of suboptimal growth-
oriented strategies; 3. Idiosyncratic (or good): 
remunerating specific resources that a controller 
contributes to a firm such as, for example, 
entrepreneurial talent and personal relationships 
(Tiscini & Raoli, 2013). 
Mechanisms such as dual-class share or 
pyramidal ownership structures, which offer “the 
possibility of controlling vast resources with limited 
amounts of capital” (Bianchi et al. 2001), aimed at 
separating voting rights and assets, are often 
elements that can generate and amplify the 
possibility of extracting private benefits (Bebchuck 
et al., 2010). After all, a dual‐class share structure 
continues to be used frequently in listed firms 
around the world (Maury & Pajuste, 2011; Banerjee & 
Masulis, 2017). For example, recently, also Google 
and Facebook adopted dual-class equity structures. 
In Italy, an example of dual-class share is “azioni di 
risparmio” (non-voting shares) that guarantees the 
holders certain capital gains in exchange of a 
limitation of the voting rights at the ordinary and 
extraordinary shareholders' meetings of the 
company. 
Usually, the greater value attributable to the 
non-voting shares compared to the voting shares in 
favour of a more favourable treatment in terms of 
dividend distribution (or redemption of capital in 
the event of liquidation) is more than offset by the 
lack of value inherent in the voting rights, as 
recognized in the voting shares. 
However, it shall be observed that in Italy, after 
more than 40 years14 this stock class is going 
through a progressive and inexorable extinction 
(Sacco Ginevri, 2014). The pros and cons of dual 
class shares have been extensively discussed and 
more recently, there were some criticisms of dual 
class shares by several of the world’s biggest money 
managers. For example, Blackrock hopes that 
companies with dual or multi-class capital 
structures may balance out shareholder voting 
rights on key proxy decisions, which might be 
caused by conflicts, such as executive pay or related-
party transactions15. 
Exogenous changes to the legal and regulatory 
environment (like Consolidated Law on Finance 
(Testo Unico della Finanza)) and an increasing 
internationalization of the investor basis of Italian 
firms make non-voting shares less attractive for 
controlling shareholders (Bigelli et al., 2011).  
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to review the 
issue of private benefit measured by voting premium 
in the Italian market based on more recent data. 
While many studies state that majority shareholders 
extract private benefits of control from minority 
shareholders, there is a much less empirical 
examination of the private benefits of control when 
the voting premium is negative. The major 
contribution of the paper is that it gives evidence of 
the existence in Italy of a negative voting rights 
                                                          
14 Savings shares have been introduced into Italian corporate law by law 7 
giugno 1974, n. 216 (artt. 14 e ss.). 
15 https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-br/literature/publication/blk-a-
potential-solution-for-voting-rights-and-index-inclusion-issues-october2017.pdf 
premium more than a positive voting premium, thus 
conflicting with both the assumptions and the 
observations from other countries and by other 
researchers.  
Our assumption is that this negative voting 
rights premium is the result of an interaction of four 
effects: i) firm inherent features; ii) regulation 
aspects; iii) liquidity risk and iv) presence of 
shareholders bearing a risk that is not offset by 
over-returns. We thereby contribute to the lively 
debate existing in the literature about the private 
benefit of control. The other part of this paper has 
the following structure. Section 2 gives a brief review 
of the literature and theoretical background. 
Section 3 describes the procedure for data collection 
and selection. Section 4 analyses the main results. 
Section 5 introduces a discussion while section 6 
offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
 
There are different ways in which controlling 
shareholders can expropriate minority ones and gain 
private benefits of control. Several classifications of 
private control benefits are available in the 
literature, as there are several factors distinguishing 
these benefits from each other since they originate 
from different sources (Ehrhardt & Nowak, 2003; 
Esposito De Falco, 2017). For example, depending on 
the characteristics of the shareholders, different 
private benefits are possible. Private benefits of 
control, such as exaggerated salaries, self-dealing or 
synergies favouring other businesses of the 
controller, are more likely to be associated with 
strategic shareholders such as entrepreneurs, family 
owners, managers and industrial investors; whereas 
institutional investors typically benefit only from the 
cashflow rights associated with the ownership 
(Neumann, 2003) 
In the last decades, corporate governance 
literature confirms the existence of different 
mechanisms to calculate a control premium 
(Zingales, 1994, 1995; Nenova, 2003; Barclay & 
Holderness, 1989; Neumann, 2003; Ordegaart, 2007; 
Bigelli & Croce, 2013; Kalay et al., 2014).  
The control premium or voting premium can be 
defined as the price that a potential bidder would be 
willing to pay to atomistic holders of voting stock to 
establish control over the company.  
Literature suggests two indirect methods to 
estimate the private benefits. Indirect method 
because the private benefits of control are rarely 
directly observable or measurable. The first method 
is the block premium approach suggested by Barclay 
and Holderness (1989). In this case, private benefits 
can be measured by using the difference between 
the block transaction price and the market price 
after the transaction. The difference between the 
price per share paid by the acquiring party and the 
price per share prevailing on the market gives the 
differential payoff accrued by the controlling 
shareholder.  
The second method relies on the existence of 
companies with multiple classes of stock with 
different voting rights: it is based on the difference 
between voting shares and non-voting shares. This 
difference can be used to estimate the scope of the 
private benefits of control (Zingales, 1994, 1995) and 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 15, Issue 3, Spring 2018 
 
94 
it is called “voting premium”. 
A third method, as suggested by Sancetta and 
Gennaro (2011), consists in the observation of prices 
of the majority and minority shares within the 
transactions entered into under tender offer rules 
(OPA) (see also Massari et al., 2006).  
A seminal paper on this topic is undoubtedly 
that by Barclay and Holderness (1989). They show 
that in contrast with the hypothesis that the 
ownership of listed companies is generally non-
concentrated and the shareholders should receive 
benefits in proportion to their share of shares held, 
many companies are characterized by the presence 
of one or more shareholders with a higher 
percentage of company shares. They receive more 
benefits than they should in proportion. The authors 
examine the prices of a sample consisting of 63 
equity block transactions in the United States over 
the period between 1978 and 1983 on the two main 
US markets, the New York Stock Exchange and the 
American Stock Exchange. The results show how the 
transactions of package control stock are realized, in 
most cases, by recognizing significant premium to 
the owner. The transaction prices recorded by the 
companies in the sample are 20% higher than the 
stock market prices after the announcement and 
this happens in more than 80% of the cases, as 
proven by how buyers pay a higher price in order to 
have the benefits of control. 
Ehrhardt and Nowak (2003), instead, inquire 
the existence and nature of the private benefits of 
control in Germany, by analysing the initial public 
offer and monitoring family-owned companies and 
tracking their evolution up to ten years after the IPO. 
The authors analyse a sample of 105 initial public 
offerings during the period from 1970 to 1991 in 
Germany. They show that in order to maintain the 
private benefits over time, the owners have 
established a dual-class share structure. After ten 
years of market listings, only one company out of 
the 105 of the sample featured a diffuse ownership 
structure; which shows the great value of control in 
Germany. Overall, founding families continue to 
exert control: in 65% of the cases, the family remains 
involved, holding an average share of 63%. 
The first attempt to measure the private 
benefits of control through the voting premium was 
made in the past by Lease et al. (1983); they 
identified a difference of price between common 
shares and shares with limited voting rights. This 
difference allows explaining the initial hypothesis of 
the authors that foresaw a superior price for the 
shares with voting rights. 
In 26 companies with a dual-class share 
structure out of the 30 analysed in the United States 
between 1940 and 1960, a difference was reported 
that is useful to explain the hypothesis of the 
authors. Common shares were traded on a stock 
exchange at an average price 5,4% higher than non-
voting shares. 
To give a general overview and to estimate the 
different levels of private benefits in various 
countries Dick and Zingales (2004) investigated the 
transactions in 39 countries between 1990 and 2000. 
The authors observe in the sample that the 
possession of the majority of voting shares 
increases the value of the control package share by 
the 9,5%. 
The results also show that, if there is a second 
shareholder with significant holdings, this will play a 
positive effect on the price. On average, the value of 
the control is 14%, but in some countries, it can be 
as low as 3%, while in others as high a 65%. As 
predicted by theory, higher private benefits of 
control are associated with less developed capital 
markets, more concentrated ownership and more 
privately negotiated privatizations.  
The results show that private benefits are very 
variable among the different countries; in 14 
countries they are reported to be lower than 3%, 
while in 10 countries the premium is over 25%.  
A cross-country analysis was also carried out 
by Nenova (2003) and is based on the hypothesis 
that the laws on shareholders protection in the 
different countries have an impact on the type of 
ownership structure, on the market value of the 
companies, on the private benefits and on control 
premium. Therefore, she argues that the voting 
premium may differ from country to country 
because of the varying impact of legislation on 
minority shareholders protection. The results show 
that in countries where there is a greater level of 
legal protection for investors and where the quality 
of legislation on transfer controls and the law 
enforcement system are more effective, the value of 
control – understood as vote premium- tends to be 
lesser. 
In particular, it can be observed that the 
possibility of extracting private benefits of control is 
higher in the French civil law countries, where the 
value of control premium is on average 22.6%, while 
on the contrary, it is lower in countries with a 
common law legal system with an average value of 
1.6% for control premium and in Scandinavian civil 
law system with an average of less than 0.5%. 
Feldhutter et al. (2016) show that an increase in 
voting premiums is associated with a firm’s 
worsening credit rating. Thus, the price of bank 
loans should be higher for companies where large 
shareholders or managers possess high private 
benefits of control. 
Recently, Lin et al. (2018), using a sample of 
12,476 loans to 2,006 U.S. firms between 1997 and 
2015, find that loan spreads are significantly higher 
when firms have higher private benefits of control. 
Therefore, firms with higher private benefits of 
control must pay higher costs to obtain bank loans. 
Other researchers examined the relationship 
between national culture and private benefits of 
control (Roe, 2002; Griffin et al., 2014). For example, 
Salzmann and Soypak (2017) analyse the 
relationship between national culture and private 
benefits of control, using Excess Voting Rights, 
measured as the difference between voting and cash 
flow rights of the largest blockholder. Their results 
indicate that firms in countries with higher power 
distance show a more unequal distribution of power 
among shareholders, whereas firms in countries 
with higher individualism show a more equal 
distribution of power among shareholders. Zhang et 
al. (2013) find that private benefits of control are 
larger in collectivist as opposed to individualist 
cultures, consistent with the argument that agency 
problems between corporate insiders and outside 
investors are severe in a collectivist culture. 
The special peculiarity of the Italian context, 
considered as a country where low investor 
protection enables controlling shareholders to 
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extract private benefits and where the ownership of 
companies is often in the hands of the founding 
families, has always attracted a special attention to 
this topic. A first important contribution to the 
definition of the voting premium method and to the 
study of the Italian context in this sense is the one 
given by Zingales (1994). The author shows the 
existence of control premium by analysing a sample 
of 391 observations of 96 companies listed on the 
Milan Stock Exchange between 1987 and 1990. The 
results obtained by the author report an average 
premium of 82%, a very high value due to the 
number of private benefits and the probability that 
minority shareholders will have a determining 
impact in the event of a change in control. 
Linciano (2002) reports that between 1989 and 
2000 the monthly-recorded differential price 
between common and savings shares showed a 
remarkable decrease. The trend of the medium 
voting premium dropped from 85% in 1989 to 37% 
in 2000. The results obtained confirm the 
hypothesis of the author that the changes in the 
listed company’s legislation with the introduction of 
the TUF in 1998 had contributed to a reduction of 
the private benefits of control, thus increasing the 
level of shareholders minority protection. The entry 
into force of the TUF seems having reduced the level 
of the average value of private benefits of control 
between 21% and 25%.  
Chiesi and Pavarani (2009) analyse the issue 
with a focus on Italian banking sector. The analysis 
of 190 equity packages transactions by Italian listed 
banks between 1984 and 2004 showed that the 
control premium for the sample concerned was 
significant since its average amounted at 13.44%. As 
for the traded shares packages that are greater in 
size than 2%, the medium premium increases to 
18,61%. In order to calculate this premium, the 
authors compared the transaction price with the 
official stock price on the day following the 
announcement of the transaction.  
Another contribution on the banking sector is 
the one provided by Gianfrate et al. (2012), which 
carry out a cross-country analysis on a sample of 
157 transactions in the sector in 40 different 
countries. The results of the survey show that the 
average level of private benefits of the banking 
sector is 3,3%. However, the analysis also reveals 
that control premium is considerably higher in the 
case of French civil law countries, like in Nenova’s 
studies, where there is a lower level of investors’ 
protection. In general, banking operations in civil 
law countries show higher control premium than 
banks operating in countries with different legal 
systems. The work inspiring this contribution is the 
one by Linciano (2002), which investigates the 
impact of the regulation on Italian listed companies 
on the trend of private benefits of control measured 
through the voting premium. The main aim of the 
survey is an attempt to identify the effects of the 
laws introduced in the Italian legal system to 
guarantee a greater protection of minority 
shareholders, able to limit the expropriation 
mechanisms by the ownership group.  
Caprio and Croce (2008) analyse a sample of 
116 companies that issued non-voting shares during 
the period of analysis (1974-2003). The results 
obtained include an average voting premium of 
44,3%; precisely, in the first years after the 
introduction of non-voting shares (1977-1980), when 
the non-voting shares were issued by a few 
companies, the value of voting premium was almost 
negligible. Since 1981, the value of the voting 
premium began to increase from 80% in 1986 to its 
maximum in 1988. Vice versa, the average premium 
reported a decreasing trend since the introduction 
of the legislation on OPA and the introduction of the 
TUF, until 2003 when the average control premium 
was 19, 76%. 
Sancetta and Gennaro (2011) investigate the 
relationship between governance systems and 
protection of minority shareholders in Italy in order 
to evaluate the efficacy of a corporate governance 
system. They studied the level of control premium 
resulting from the tender offers made in Italy in the 
period 1999-2009 with the aim of assessing whether 
compliance with best practices would result in a 
reduction of control premium and would enhance 
the minority shareholders protection. The average 
control premium recorded dropped from 15,35% in 
the first 12 months to 3,40% in the month preceding 
the OPA. Using a regression model, the authors 
obtained information on the impact of compliance 
with best practices over the size of control premium; 
in particular, an inverse correlation between 
compliance with best practices and majority 
premiums was observed. It is interesting to note that 
companies with governance system complying with 
the legislation can better protect the minority 
shareholders’ interests.  
Bigelli and Croce (2013) argue that higher 
fractions of non-voting shares, higher dividend 
privileges, market prices closer to the par value of 
the shares and smaller firms lead to higher voting 
premiums. They also suggest a new measure for the 
voting right, the Relative Vote Segment, which 
incorporates dividend privileges into the inferior 
class of shares. In this way, the authors test and 
compare it against the standard Relative Price 
Difference and the Nenova (2003) measure based on 
Italian data between 1998– 2008. Results show that 
the voting rights' estimates by Relative Vote Segment 
are significantly greater and more accurate than 
when using other measures: the average voting 
premium is equal to 35.63% when estimated with the 
RVS, versus a significantly lower 20.35% when 
calculated as a price difference between the two 
classes of shares and the Nenova measure only 
reports a 1.30% average voting premium, which 
appears to be even lower in some sample years. 
Ødegaard (2007), in opposition to the financial 
theory that argues that the voting premium should 
be either positive or equal to zero, gives evidence of 
the existence of a negative voting rights premium. 
This negative voting rights premium is a result of 
the interaction of three effects: Corporate control 
(positive effect), market segmentation of foreign and 
domestic equity owners (negative effect) and stock 
liquidity. 
A negative voting premium can be observed 
also in Denmark (Neumann, 2003) and this result 
shows that in the absence of takeover contests, 
where the voting right becomes crucial in a transfer 
of corporate control, the price differential in stock 
classes with identical dividend rights is more likely 
to reflect investors’ liquidity risk. 
In conclusion, it emerges that the possibility of 
extracting private benefits of control is either 
positively or negatively conditioned by different 
drivers (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. A brief summary of drivers 
 
Drivers Relationship Some Authors 
Ownership concentration Positive Zingales (1994); Linciano (2002); Rydqvist (1992) 
Legal protections of shareholders Negative Dick and Zingales (2004); Linciano (2002); Nenova (2003) 
Stock liquidity Positive Barclay and Holderness (1989); Neumann (2003); Ødegaard (2007) 
Stability business Positive Barclay and Holderness (1989); Chiesi and Pavarani (2009) 
Dividend privileges Positive Bigelli and Croce (2013) 
Compliance with best practices Negative Sancetta and Gennaro (2009) 
 
Many papers reveal how the civil law system 
offers a better possibility to extract private benefits, 
as opposed to countries of a common law matrix, in 
which there seems to be less extraction of private 
benefits thanks to a better protection of the 
investors, also due to the so-called market for 
corporate control. The ownership concentration is a 
determining factor, or as where there is a greater 
concentration, it will be easier to extract benefits. A 
third element is the development of the markets and 
thus the related liquidity of trades do not facilitate 
(or make evident) the extraction of private benefits. 
Finally, the sector where the companies operate 
could influence the private benefits of control. 
There seems to be a better possibility to extract 
private benefits where there are stable businesses 
(Chiesi & Parvani, 2009), as for example the banking 
business, this is further confirmed by the presence 
of investors that grant a bonus for more control 
when the prices of the shares are less volatile and 
the company has more liquidity (Barclay & 
Holdrness, 1989). Demstez and Lehn (1985) defined 
the media sector as one of those sectors where there 
are higher private benefits of control, whilst Dick 
and Zingales (2004) indicate further sectors, such as 
wholesale trade companies, finance (financial, 
insurance and real estate), transport companies and 
utility. 
 
3. METHOD 
 
The sample includes all the companies that traded 
voting shares and non-voting shares on the Italian 
Stock Exchange between 2007 and 2017. In 
particular, the starting sample consists of 36 
companies that issued non-voting shares in the 
period 2007–2017, as reported by the annual report 
Indici e Dati (Indexes and Data) published by R&S 
Mediobanca concerning Italian stock market-listed 
companies. After some exclusions due to missing 
data and a few non-voting shares never traded on 
the stock exchange, the final sample consisted of 22 
companies with both voting and non-voting shares 
listed on Milan Stock Exchange. As observed by 
Bigelli et al. (2011) the number of Italian dual class 
listed firms has been declining in the last years. At 
the end of 2008, there were only 30 dual class firms 
(with both voting and non-voting shares) listed on 
Milan stock exchange out of the 336 Italian listed 
companies (8.93%), versus 94 out of 266 in 1990 
(35.34%). We obtained stock prices and other 
financial information from Datastream and 
Bloomberg. Ownership structure data were taken 
from the website of “Borsa Italiana” and from the 
report of corporate governance of each company. 
Following the methodology proposed by Zingales 
(1994) and based on Linciano study (2002), the 
voting premium was calculated as (Pv – Pnv)/Pnv, 
where Pv is the price of voting shares and Pnv is the 
price of non-voting shares. The voting premium was 
calculated on a yearly basis by averaging monthly 
price data (more precisely, prices observed on the 
last trading day of each month).  
The analysis was run as follows: the sample of 
companies that reported a positive voting premium 
was analysed separately from that of companies 
reporting a negative sign. Successively, the analysis 
took both the sector of affiliation and the ownership 
concentration of the companies into account. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
Table 2 shows the average voting premium over time 
in our sample. 
 
Table 2. Average voting premium over time (2007-2017) 
 
Company 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Banco Carige -0,874 -0,877 -0,900 -0,918 -0,911 -0,922 -0,939 -0,965 -0,984 -0,994 -0,995 
Banco di Desio e della Brianza 0,03 0,05 0,03 0,03 0,13 -0,02 0,04 0,10 0,13 0,00 0,11 
Borgosesia -0,213 -0,094 0,052 -0,081 -0,180 -0,410 -0,147 -0,147 -0,086 -0,210 -0,293 
Buzzi Unicem 0,43 0,50 0,73 0,65 0,82 1,04 0,93 0,73 0,62 0,77 0,80 
Danieli & C. 0,38 0,54 0,76 0,83 0,85 0,85 0,53 0,41 0,38 0,36 0,37 
Edison 0,080 -0,057 -0,201 -0,274 -0,135 0,137 - - - - - 
Gemina 0,302 -0,082 -0,597 -0,579 -0,293 -0,045 -0,032 - - - - 
Ifil 0,05 - - - - - - - - - - 
Indesit -0,07 -0,09 -0,22 0,16 0,08 0,09 0,12 - - - - 
Intek Group 0,024 -0,227 -0,353 -0,452 -0,454 -0,153 -0,170 -0,323 -0,379 -0,442 -0,377 
Intesa San Paolo 0,07 0,16 0,35 0,27 0,21 0,21 0,20 0,17 0,11 0,07 0,06 
Italcementi 0,28 0,28 0,62 0,56 0,80 0,84 0,69 0,52 - - - 
Italmobiliare -0,309 -0,311 -0,271 -0,292 -0,229 -0,216 -0,209 -0,239 -0,243 -0,327  
Marzotto -0,002 - - - - -  - - - - 
Milano Assicurazioni 0,068 0,083 0,061 -0,025 0,050 -0,003 -0,258 - - - - 
Saes Getters 0,20 0,15 0,24 0,26 0,49 0,42 0,10 0,16 0,18 0,31 0,25 
Saipem -0,811 -0,814 -0,807 -0,796 -0,797 -0,780 -0,837 -0,821 -0,878 -0,926 -0,912 
Salini Impregilo -0,442 -0,608 -0,714 -0,730 -0,719 -0,740 -0,711 -0,684 -0,602 -0,600 -0,578 
Stefanel -0,956 -0,982 -0,983 -0,994 -0,997 -0,998 -0,998 -0,998 -0,998 -0,999 -0,999 
Telecom Italia 0,25 0,33 0,38 0,25 0,17 0,18 0,23 0,28 0,23 0,23 0,22 
Unicredit -0,494 -0,543 -0,608 -0,555 -0,581 -0,770 -0,623 -0,512 -0,535 -0,723 -0,700 
Vincenzo Zucchi 0,358 0,049 -0,434 0,362 0,559 -0,591 -0,606 -0,628 -0,667 -0,860 -0,873 
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As the table shows, not all the historical series 
of the companies are complete, since, during the 
years the shares of some companies have been 
withdrawn from the stock market due to fusions or 
mergers.  
More in general, the results show an average 
value of 30.17% for the sub-sample that has average 
values of the positive voting premiums. This value is 
far the studies of Zingales (1993) whilst it is in line 
with the values of Linciano (2002). Thus, there 
seems to be a further decrease of the value for the 
Italian context but it is high if compared with 
European contexts. 
 
Table 3. Average voting premium – sub sample positive 
 
Company Voting Premium Sector 
Banco di Desio e della Brianza 5,56% Banking 
Buzzi Unicem 73,23% Industrial 
Danieli & C. 58,78% Industrial 
Ifil 5,46% Industrial 
Indesit 0,94% Industrial 
Intesa San Paolo 18,13% Banking 
Italcementi 58,91% Industrial 
Saes Getters 25,33% Industrial 
Telecom Italia 25,16% Telecommunication 
Average 30,17%  
 
Figure 1 focuses on the evolution over time of 
the estimated average voting premium for all of the 
nine companies that form the first sub-sample, 
characterized by positive values for the voting 
premium. From the graph, we can see that until 
2011 the voting premium showed values below 40% 
to then greatly increase within the end of the same 
year, with a 58,8% in the year of 2012. Subsequently, 
the value of the voting premium decreases until the 
last period of observation, where it stands at 31,2%. 
 
Figure 1. Time series of average voting premium (2007-2017) 
 
 
 
From the analysis of the related sector, the 
results show how three companies have the average 
value of the voting premium definitely higher 
respect to the other companies in the sample. This is 
mainly for companies that operate in the industrial 
sector, more precisely Buzzi Unicem, Danieli & C. 
and Italcementi. This reveals a greater possibility to 
extract private benefits within such companies, even 
though the limited number of observations does not 
make it possible to make precise considerations. 
Also referring to the trend of the voting premium 
based on the related sector, during the interval being 
analysed, it is confirmed that the industrial sector is 
characterized by a higher value of the voting 
premium respect to the other sectors throughout 
most of the time of the analysis. 
 
Figure 2. Voting premium for sectors 
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Such results may lead one to assume that 
within the industrial sector there is a greater 
possibility to extract private benefits of control to 
the disadvantage of the minorities within other 
sectors.  
The analysis focuses on the fact that 13 
companies of the sample reveal a negative value of 
the average voting premium within the analysis 
period taken into account (Table 4). A first possible 
explanation of the negative values of the voting 
premium could be caused due to the costs derived 
from the control (private cost), rather than the 
private benefits extractable from the detention of 
command. Furthermore, in some cases, as for 
example in the Stefanel company, the negative 
voting premium for the whole interval is determined 
by the high price established when the non-voting 
share is issued. 
 
Table 4. Average voting premium – sub sample 
negative 
 
Company Voting Premium Sector 
Banco Carige -93,16% Banking 
Borgosesia -15,36% Industrial 
Edison -9,51% Industrial 
Gemina -21,21% Industrial 
Intek Group -30,28% Industrial 
Italmobiliare -26,06% Industrial 
Marzotto -0,19% Industrial 
Milano Assicurazioni -0,59% Banking 
Saipem -83,02% Industrial 
Salini Impregilo -65,84% Industrial 
Stefanel -99,14% Industrial 
Unicredit -59,95% Banking 
Vincenzo Zucchi -28,16% Industrial 
 
In the period of analysis, apparently, investors 
tend to systematically overestimate and/or 
underestimate voting share and non-voting shares.  
The last aspect considered in the analysis is 
that of the ownership concentration. With a high 
degree of ownership concentration and in a situation 
in which there are no expectations of variation of 
the property, a voting premium that is zero or close 
to zero should correspond. In case of a more 
dispersed property, the values of the voting 
premium should be higher than zero. 
However, this conclusion is not valid if, for 
example as in Italy, a discipline on the public 
bidding related only to the ordinary shares is 
envisaged, because in such a situation the changing 
of the ownership structures is followed by the 
obligation of the buyer to share the award for 
control with the minority shareholders. Our results, 
in fact, show a nonlinear relation between ownership 
concentration and voting premium values (Table 5) 
since, in some cases, a high voting premium value 
corresponds to a high concentration (Buzzi Unicem 
and Danieli & C.). 
 
Table 5. Concentration and voting premium positive 
 
Firms 
Average of a large 
shareholder 
Average of % 
voting premium 
Banco Desio e 
della Brianza 
51% 5,56% 
Buzzi Unicem 57,95% 73,23% 
Danieli & C. 66,86% 58,78% 
Intesa San Paolo 9,31% 18,13% 
Saes Getters 51,98% 25,33% 
Telecom 21,95% 25,16% 
5. DISCUSSION  
 
The paper does not examine positive and negative 
aspects of private benefits of control but focusing 
on the status of art of private benefit in Italy. 
Important measures concerning shareholders’ rights 
and transactions subject to conflicts of interest have 
brought Italian legislation broadly into line with the 
prevailing international standards. In particular, we 
maintain that control structures have changed and 
three are the main findings of our analysis.  
First, a reduction of the number of saving 
shares in circulation. If we think that in 2016, in 244 
companies listed on the Italian telematics stock 
market, only 21 were characterized by the fact that 
they still had saving shares in circulation (the 
number further decreased in 2017), unlike the 84 
companies that had saving shares in circulation in 
1990. As already stated by others (Bigelli et al, 2013), 
a probable explanation of such a drastic reduction of 
the diffusion of such shares, could be due to the 
possibility given to the partners owners of saving 
shares to convert them in ordinary shares within a 
certain period of time; such a conversion could also 
be obligatory. The obligatory conversion could be 
implemented to simplify the composition of the 
share capital of the company, and to furthermore set 
a homogenisation of the rights of all the 
shareholders and to also more efficiently exploit 
possible opportunities offered by the capital market 
in the implementation of the future development 
plans. The obligatory conversion, establishing the 
concentration of the operation on a single quotation 
line, will increase the overall free float of the 
ordinary shares, creating the conditions for a major 
liquidity of the stocks and, consequently, for a major 
regularity and continuity in the exchanges and a 
stronger interest of the investors. Furthermore, the 
saving shares are slowly disappearing from the 
market since the guarantee of the minimum 
dividend, the counterpart to the absence of the 
voting right makes these stocks more expensive for 
the company. As highlighted by Banerjee and 
Masulis (2017), non-voting shares dilute the cash 
flow rights of all existing shareholders, as more non-
voting shares relative to voting shares must be 
issued to raise the same amount of project funding. 
This causes the aggregate dividend payout to be 
divided among more shares, thereby reducing the 
per share dividend. 
Second, surprisingly in the analysed period, we 
have a greater presence of companies with a 
negative voting premium. Generally, the financial 
theory would argue that the voting premium should 
be positive or zero since the voting shares have 
additional options relative to the non-voting shares. 
A negative voting means that the buyer of the block 
supports a cost of control and not a benefit. The 
costs could be related to monitoring or costs for 
legal expenses related to conflicts with minority 
shareholders. Such a result is new for the Italian 
context and it in line only with Ødegaard (2007) in 
the Norwegian context and with Neumann (2003) for 
the Sweedish context. This provides up-to-date 
evidence for comparison with cross-country studies 
aiming at assessing the quality of rules devoted to 
minority shareholders’ protection. Possible 
explanations worthy of insights and future 
researches are: 
 Specific characteristics of the company: the 
price differential could depend on some specific 
characteristics of the company, such as the debt and 
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the nature of the controlled assets, mainly intangible 
in the banking sector and tangible in the industrial 
sector.  
 Regulation aspects: non-voting shares have 
privileges regarding their capital value. During the 
settlement, they are preferred to the other types of 
shares for their entire nominal value and, in the case 
of a reduction for losses; this value is not affected 
until after the total of other shares has been 
exhausted. They also enjoy benefits in the event of 
profit distribution. In particular, if the difference 
between the dividend received by shares without 
voting rights (above) and shares with voting rights 
(lower) is large, the market value of shares without 
voting rights may be higher than the value of shares 
with rights of voting.  
 Liquidity risk: for some of the companies of 
the sample, such as Borgosesia, Saipem (in many 
cases corresponding to 0), Stefanel (in many cases 
corresponding to 0), Banca Carige and for Unicredit 
in some periods, the amount of exchange of saving 
shares is very low respect to the other companies. In 
this case, the liquidity has important implications 
for the sign of voting premiums. 
 Presence of shareholders/investors that take 
over a risk that is uncompensated by over-returns. 
In the case of Banca Unicredit and Banca Carige, 
such actions could have been carried out by the 
Foundations the have played an important role in 
accordance with their mission that is of social value. 
As has been shown by Chiesi and Parvani (2009), the 
Foundations have safeguarded the assets from other 
types of investors more keen on the extraction of 
private benefits. In this case, a superior voting 
power should have no economic value.  
Finally, we believe that the voting premium 
method shows some limits since it is restricted to 
cases in which firms have dual-class shares and both 
classes of shares are traded (Kalay et al., 2014). A 
problem with this method is that there might be 
some differences in price levels due to the difference 
in the price of voting and non-voting rights. As 
affirmed above, Italian legislation and the reduction 
of a number of non-voting shares should encourage 
a comparison of premium voting with other 
methodologies that take into account market price 
shares and the OPA price shares in the tender offers 
launched on Italian regulated markets (Sancetta & 
Gennaro, 2011). 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS  
 
In conclusion, Italian corporate governance is 
constantly taking shape (Colli, 2009) and interesting 
actions are being taken to keep it away from the 
“family capitalist” situation that traditionally 
characterizes it. Although Italy has a reputation of 
poor corporate governance, being it characterized by 
an inactive takeover market, limited presence of 
institutional investors and low legal protection for 
investors, we do believe that something is changing 
“and yet” Italian corporate governance “ still moves” 
(“eppur si muove”) as opposite to Culpepper 
position (2007). For example, the adoption of the 
Shareholder's Right Directive, a directive aimed at 
protecting shareholders, has facilitated their 
participation on Annual General Meetings, in 
particular, that of the institutional investors. 
Therefore, this favoured the debate on some 
important issues, such as say on pay in Italy 
(Esposito De Falco et al., 2016; Belcredi et al., 2017) 
or attention to ESG issues (Cucari et al., 2017). Under 
this perspective, this study, by analysing the voting 
premium over the last 10 years (2007-2017) in a 
sample of companies, was able to show one of the 
many changes occurred in the Italian corporate 
governance: reduction of non-voting share and 
prevalence of negative voting rights premium. In 
addition, within the industrial sector, there is a 
greater possibility to extract private benefits of 
control to the disadvantage of the minorities within 
other sectors. 
Hopefully, this study will encourage further 
analyses of the improvements involving Italian 
corporate governance. Indeed, it showed that 
interesting evidence already exists, but that still 
much remains to do in the future. Nevertheless, our 
paper is not without limits requiring further 
investigations. First, our results should be held using 
alternative measures of private benefit of control. In 
this way, we can verify if, in Italy, we have a greater 
presence of companies with private cost rather than 
private benefits extractable from the detention of 
command. Second, we do not have compared the 
pre-crisis and crisis period, but a complete 
understanding may be achieved comparing the 
ownership structure and capital structure before, 
during, and after the crisis. 
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